In the Matter of the Estate of Cora E. Fenner : Appellant\u27s Reply Brief by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)
1953
In the Matter of the Estate of Cora E. Fenner :
Appellant's Reply Brief
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
C. Preston Allen; Adam M. Duncan; Attorneys for Appellant;
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court
Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
















IN THE ,SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
In the Matter of the Estate of 




APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
Appeal From the District Court of the 
Second Judicial District, 
In and For Weber County, State of Utah, 
Honorable Charles G. Co-vvley, Judge 
-~~ \t; ~~ }) C. PRESTON ALLEN, 
.,.;,-),. ___ ,....., 
ADAM M. DUNCAN, 
Attorneys for Appella.nt, 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
INDEX 
Page 
STATEMENT OF F'ACTS·------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT·--------------------------------------------------------------- 2 
ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES·------------------------------------------------------- 2 
POINT 'I. THE INTEREST' MRS. FENNER OWNED AT 
THE T'IME OF HER DEATH IN THE PROCEEDS OF 
THE THREE INSURANCE POLICIES WAS NOT A 
POWER OF APPOINTMENT BUT A FEE, AND 
THEREFORE, SHOULD HAVE BEEN INCLUD·ED IN 
THE DECEDENT'S GROSS ESTATE, FOR TAX PUR-
POSES -----------------------------------------------------------------··------------------------------ 2 
POINT II. SHOULD THIS COURT CHARACTERIZE THE 
INTEREST TAKEN BY MRS. FENNER IN THE IN-
SURANCE POLICIES AS A GENERAL POWER OF 
A.PPOINT'MENT, SUCH AN INTEREST IS NEVERTHE-
LESS WITHIN THE INCLUSION OF T'IT'LE 59-12-3, 
UTAH CODE ANNOTAT'ED, 1953·--------------------------------------------- 7 
(A) The Common Law Theory of Powers of Appoint-
ment is Anachronistic and Entirely Unjustified 
by Present Concepts of Property Ownership and 
Responsibility -----------------------------------------------------------------· 7 
(B) Many Courts Realistically Treat a General Power 
of Appointment as the Substantial, Equivalent 
of Ownership, and as such, Have Characterized 
it as a Fee for Tax Purposes ______________________ ------------------ 9 
(C) The Case of U. S. vs. Field is not Controlling and 
is not Persuasive inasmuch as the 1916 Federal 
Revenue Statute which was Construed Differed 
Materially from our Present Utah Estate Tax 
Statute ---------------------------------------------------------··-------------------- 10 
CONCLUSION --------------------------------------------------------------------------·-------------------- 11 
TEXTS CITED 
10 A.L.R. "Digest, Succession & Estate Taxes, Sec. 38 ______ -------------------- 10 
52 Harvard Law Review 494 ---------------------------------------------------------------------· 3 
77 No. Carolina Law Review -··----------------·-------------------------------------------------- 8 
52 Yale Law Journal 296 ------------------------------------------------------------~------------- 7 
I Paul, Federal Estate and Gift Taxation, Note 7, P. 223 ····---------------- 3 
STATUTES CITED 
Title 59-12-3, Utah Code Annotated ( 1953) ----------··-------------------------------2, 11 
U. S. Statutes at Large, Vol. 39, p. 777 ---------------- ----------------------·------------ 10 
i 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  




Ballard v. Helburn, 9 F. Supp. 812; aff'd. 85 F. 2d 613; 
T.C. 4729, March 18, 1937; Reg. 80, Art. 25 .................................. 9 
Bullen v. Wisconsin, 240 U.S. 625 ·---··················-····-···························-·-·~ 9 
Chandler v. Kelsey, 205 U.S. 466, 51 L. Ed. 882, 
27 Sup. Ct. 550 -··--·-·················-··-····-··-··---··························-·················· 9 
Chase Nat. Bank v. United States, 278 U.S. 327 .................................. 9 
Gurry v .. McCanless, 123 A.L.R. 162, 307 U.S. 357, 
83 L. Ed. 1339, 59 Sup. Ct. 900 ·----·-···-······------···································· 9 
Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co. v. McCaughan, 34 F. 2d 600, 
604, cert. den., 280 U.S. 602 ----··--·····---··--·····-··············-··· .................. 9 
Graves v. Schmidlapp, 141 A.L.R. 948, 315 U.S. 657, 
86 L. Ed. 1097, 62 Sup. Ct. 870 ........................................ .................. 9 
Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106 ........................................................... 9 
Helvering v. Parker, 84 F. 2d 838 ............................................................ 9 
Levy's Estate v. Commissioner, 65 F. 2d 41'2 ---··--·--·-························-··· 9 
Morgan v. Commissioner, 309 U.S. 78 ----------·---------·-··--·-------···················· 9 
Mc-Kelvy v. Comm., 82 F. 2d 393 ···------·····-······--·······························-······· 9 
Orr v. Gilman, 183 U.S. '278, 46 L. Ed. 196, 22 Sup. Ct. 213................. 9 
Pennsylvania Co. v. Comm., 79 F. 2d 295; cert. den., 
296 u.s. 651 ·-----------------------------·-------------··················--·--·-··········----······· 9 
Standard Oil Co. of N. J. vs. Powell, 144 S.C. 354, 
142 S.E'. 612 -------·····----·-·····--·········--·--···············----·· ............................... 3 
U. S. v. Jacobs, 306 U.S. 363 ·····--···------·-·············-······································ 9 
U. S. v. Stanley Field, 255 U.S. 257, 65 L. E'd. 617, 
41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 256, 18 A.L.R. 1461 --····-··--·-··--·············-------········-·· 10 
Whitney vs. State Tax Commission, 309 U.S. 530, 
84 L.. Ed. 909, 60 S.C. 635 ------····---······----------·--··············--·····-···--······· 9 
ii 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
In the Matter of the Estate of 




APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF F·ACTS 
The many additional facts set forth in respondent's 
brief, ostensibly for the con11nendable purpose of adding 
a touch of "human interest" to this appeal, are entirely 
dehors the record and, of eourse, appellant has no bass 
for ascertaining their truth or falsity~Since, however, 
they are clearly irrelevant and immaterial to the issues 
before this Court, appellant sub1nits that respondent's 
State1nent of Facts is entitled to no persuasive weight. 
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PRELI~IINARY STATEMENT 
Since the respondent has failed to include a state-
ment of points upon which he relies and further, has 
failed to su1nmarize his position, it behooves us to 
atten1pt a brief restatement of his apparent contentions 
in order to frame our reply. Respondent seems to con-
tend that the interest created in ~1rs. F'enner by the 
"Special Provision" was a "power of appointment" and 
that since our gross estate statute (59-12-3, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953) does not, in terms, levy a tax on such 
a power, it was properly excluded from her gross estate 
inventory and appraisal. Respondent alludes to federal 
authority to sustain this proposition. 
ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES 
POINT I. 
THE INTEREST MRS. FENNER OWNED AT THE TIME 
OF HER DEATH IN THE PROCEEDS OF THE THREE 
INSURANCE POLICIES WAS NOT A POWER OF APPOINT-
MENT BUT A FEE, AND, THEREFORE, SHOULD HAVE 
BEEN INCLUDED IN THE DECEDENT'S GROSS ESTATE 
FOR TAX PURPOSES. 
On page 11 of Respondent's brief there is cited 
authoritative. definition of a power of appointment. This 
definition reads, in part : 
"Such a power has been defined as an 
authority' enabling one person to dispose of the 
interest which is vested in another * * * a power 
of appointment is not an absolute right of prop-
erty nor is it an estate, for it has none of the ele-
ments of an estate." (Emphasis added) 
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Did ~frs. Fenner have "'none of the ele1nents of an 
estate" and 'vhat are these eleinents ~ 
\Vho was "another" in who In the title to the proceeds 
have vested~ 
"'One of the tests of 'ownership' of money or prop-
erty is the right to dispose of, sell, convey, assign or give 
a\vay." (Sta.ndard Oil Company of N.J. vs. Powell P. 
Co. Plumbing and Contracting, 144 S.C. 354, 142, S. E. 
612, at 615) 
There can be no dispute that Mrs. Fenner had the 
legal right to dispose of the proceeds, to sell her interest, 
convey it, assign it or give it away. She la.cked none of 
the perquisites of absolute fee ownership. In every real 
sense she "owned" the proceeds. As one authority has 
indicated, "the holder of an unrestricted right to appro-
priate principal enjoys the basic delights of ownership." 
(I Paul, Fed. Estate and Gift Taxation, Note 7, P. 223 
(1942).) Under such a right to invade the corpus as was 
given 11:rs. F'enner, "the life tenant enjoys all the attrib-
utes of ownership except the formal trappings of title." 
(52 Harvard Law Review, 494 at 522) 
Quoting again Respondent's definition of a "power 
of appointment" (at p. 12 of her brief) : 
"Whether a power of appointment is or is 
not exercised, the property that was subject to 
the appointment is not subject to distribution as 
part of the estate of the donee." 
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Here again, the interest created in 1\frs. Fenner fails 
to meet Respondent's definition for, as provided in the 
last sentence of paragraph 2 of the Special Provision 
and cited at page 6 of Respondent's brief, "Should none 
of the Insured's said nieces" etc. "be surviving at the 
death of the Insured's said wife, as aforesaid, the amount 
held under said Option 1, together with any interest 
accrued thereon, or the commuted value of any unpaid 
certain installments under said Option 3, as the case 
1nay be, shall be paid in a single sum to sa.id wife's execu-
tors or administrators." Thus Mrs. Fenner was named 
as residual legatee under the policies and the proceeds 
of the policies were not, "not subject to distribution as 
part of the estate of the donee." 
''D·UE" AND ''HELD ON DEPOSIT." 
Appellant feels it cannot overstress the significance 
of the language employed in the policies and the Special 
Provision. Throughout the policy and its several addenda 
the proceeds are referred to as being "due" (Exhibit 
one, p. 4, par. 2 and 2 (b); p. 6), "payable" (Exhibit one, 
p. 3), "held on deposit" (Exhibit One, p. 4, par. 2 (b)), 
and "left on deposit" (Exhibit One, p. 4, par. 2; p. 6, par. 
1). Such phrases are inconsistent with any other conclu-
sion than that Mrs. Fenner was absolute owner of the 
proceeds. 
Paragraph onB of the Special Provision, reads: 
"It is hereby specially provided that the set-
tlement of the amount becoming due by reason of 
the death of the Insured shall be made with the 
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Insured's 'vife, CORA E. FINNER, if living, as 
provided in paragraph 2, if not living, such 
amount shall be divided into the number of equal 
shares that will provide: ... " one share for each 
of Insured's said nieces, etc. 
Paragraph 2 reads : 
The amount becoming due to the In~sured's 
sa.id wife under paragraph 1 shall be left on de-
posit with the Society in accordance vvith Option 
1 of the l\lodes of Settlement at Maturity of 
Policy during her lifetime, interest payable 
monthly, except that said wife shall have the fol-
lowing privileges: * * (a) On an interest due date 
of withdrawing the a.mou.nt held on deposit, or (b) 
At any tirne of having the amount held on deposit 
paid as a life income in accordance with Option 
3 of the said l\Jodes of Settlement. (Emphasis 
added) 
* * (The use of the word "privileges" 
here is clearly a misomer. Prior language 
[e.g., " ... settlement of the amount due 
shall be made ... " etc.] created a duty to 
pay in the Society. In Hohfeldian tern1i-
nology, 1\frs. Fenner had more than a 
"privilege," she had a "right" and the 
Society was under a "dt~ty" to pay over 
the amounts "held on deposit" and "due" 
her.) 
To lawyer and layman alike these phrases, "due" 
and "held on deposit" unequivocably mean actual 
ownership, not merely "the means of acquiring" title. 
( Cf. Resp. Brief, P. 10.) Indeed, these same phrases 
often appear as part of the agreement between bank and 
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depositor under an ordinary savings account. No one 
has yet successfully contended that because a bank 1nay 
require advance notice of withdrawal and 1nay deter1nine 
to pay out only on specific days, that the person in "\Yhose 
name the account is carried is anything but the absolute 
owner. Likewise, the adn1inistrative provision in these 
policies that the beneficiary could not withdraw the su1ns 
"due" and "held on deposit", except on given days and 
after notice, in nowise deprived her of any perquisite of 
absolute fee ownership. All Mrs. F·enner needed to do 
under the Special Provision of the policies in order to 
spend the money in any way she desired was to notify 
the Society. It seems clear, therefore, that the language 
of the policies created precisely the same rights, duties 
and obligations between herself and the company as any 
other debtor-creditor relationship-such as an ordinary 
bank deposit. 
Again, even the most cursory reading of the policies 
themselves bears out Appellants contention that title was 
not "vested in another," but in the decedent, Mrs. Fen-
ner. (R·espondent, quite understandably, has neglected 
to suggest who this "another" could conceivably have 
been.) 
Clearly, the interest which decendent took "looks 
like, sounds like and walks like" a fee. 
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POINT II. 
SHOULD THIS COURT CHARACTERIZE THE INTER-. 
EST TAKEN BY MRS. FENNER IN THE INSURANCE 
POLICIES AS A GENERAL POWER OF APPOINTMENT, 
SUCH AN INTEREST IS, NEVERTHELESS, WITHIN THE 
INCLUSION OF TITLE 59-12-3, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 
1953. 
(A) The Common Law Theory of Powers of Appointment 
is Anachronistic and Entirely Unjustified by Present Concepts 
of Property Ownership and Responsibility. 
Our position is well summarized by Professor Eisen-
stein in Volume 52 of the Yale Law Journal at page 296. 
He writes: 
" 'F·or what good reasons should contempo-
rary American taxpayers be allowed to escape a 
generation or two of estate and inheritance taxes 
by the use of a verbal form [A power of appoint-
ment] invented several centuries ago to enable 
an English gentleman to make a will of land.' 
This query is particularly relevant at a time when 
the Supreme Court is openly contemptuous of the 
'shadowy and intricate distinctions of common law 
property concepts and ancient fictions,' (U. S. 
v. Jacobs, 306 U.S. 363, 369) and 'elusive and 
subtle casuistries which feed upon the unwitty 
diversities of the law of property.' (Helvering 
v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 118.)" 
The common law concept of a power of appointment 
was that the donor of the power created something akin 
to an agency in the donee, the latter merely acting as an 
instrument of the donor in fillin_g in the blanks - the 
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title, in theory, passing directly fro1n the donor to his 
appointed objects. Thus, no interest in the property was 
deemed to have vested in the donee, even though the 
donee might be given a general power to invade the 
corpus, consume in whole or part, or appoint to any . 
object of his, the donee's, choice. 
One writer suggests that the more recent trend to-
'vard the taxing of powers of appointment was prompted 
by recognition "that the power to appoint might be so 
broad as to be tantamount to economic ownership of the 
appointed property." (Estate Taxation of Powers of 
Appointment, 77 North Carolina Law Revie-vv, 1948) 
Many old common law technicalities (e.g., the re-
quirement of a seal to validate a deed), have long since 
been abandoned as unworkable, and where public policy 
once favored retention of larger estates in one family 
line, it now favors freer alienation and the imposition of 
a just tax burden on each citizen enjoying the privileges 
of land ownership. This same policy reasoning applies 
to personalty. To allow the wealthy owner, by employ-
ing careful draftsmen, to call his absolute gift something 
else and thus escape his just tax incidence is simply to 
perpetuate an unjust and unfair legalism born of early 
English aristocratic dictate. 
To label an absolute fee something else does not, for 
tax purposes, make it so. 
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(B) Many Courts Realirstically Treat a General Power of 
Appointment as the Substantial equivalent of Ownership, and as 
such, Have ·Characterized it as a Fee for Tax Purposes. 
The state may lawfully include within its estate tax, 
property not technically owned by the decedent at death 
if the decedent stood in a relationship to the property 
which might fairly be regarded as the equivalent of 
ownership. (Btdlen v. Wi.sconsi.n, 240 U.S. 625; Leser v. 
Burnet, 46 Fed. 2d, 156.) 
The inclusion of property in respect of which the 
decedent owned a general power of appoint1nent is 
valid because a general power gives the grantee of the 
power the substantial equivalent of ownership, since he 
is free to exercise it in favor of his creditors and thus 
use the property for his own benefit. See: 
Ballard v. Helburn, 9 F. Supp. 812; aff'd. 85 
F. 2d 613 ; T. C. 4 729, March 18, 1937 ; Reg. 80, 
Art. 25; Chandler v. Kelsey, 205 U.S. 466, 51 L. 
Ed. 882, 27 Sup. Ct. 550; Chase N a~t. Bank v. 
United States, 278 U.S. 327; Curry v. McCa,nless, 
123 A.L.R. 162, 307 U.S. 357, 83 L. Ed. 1339, 59 
Sup. Ct. 900; Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co. v. 
McCanghn, 3-1 F'. 2d 600, 604, cert. den., 280 U.S. 
602; Graves v. Schmidla]; }J, 1-±1 A.L.R. 948, 315 
U.S. 657, 86 L. Ed. 1097, 62 Sup. Ct. 870; Helver-
ing v. Barker, H-± F. 2d 838; Levy's Estate v. Cant-
missioner, 65 F. 2d 412; Morgan v. Commissioner, 
309 U.S. 78; M cK eZ,z;y v. Comnz., 82 F. 2d 393; 
Orr v. Gilman, 183 U.S. 278, -1G L. Ed. 196, 22 Sup .. 
Ct. 213; Pennsylvania Co. v. Comm., 79 F·. 2d 295; 
cert. den., 296 U.S. 651; Whitney vs. State Tnx 
Commission, 309 U.S. 530, 84 L. Ed. 909, 60 S.C. 
635. 
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"For tax purposes a general power of appoint1nent 
is equivalent to ownership of the property subject to the 
power." (Quoted in 'T ol. 10 A.L.R. Digest, Succession 
and Estate Taxes, Sec. 38, P. 683, and cases cited 
thereat). 
Respondent has presented no reason, and Appellant 
submits there is none, why a person holding the absolute 
power over chattels, however the absolute power is 
-labeled, should not bear his proportionate responsibility 
for maintenance of his government by paying his share 
of the tax load. 
(C) The Case of U. S. vs. Field is not Controlling and is 
not Persuasive inasmuch as the Federal Revenue Statute which 
was Construed in 1921 Differed Materially from our Present Utah 
Estate Tax Statute. 
Respondent has cited us the Field case (U. S. v. 
Stanley Field, 255 U.S. 257, 65 L. Ed. 617, 41 Sup. Ct. 
Rep. 256, 18 A.L.R. 1461) in which the Supreme Court 
held that the 1916 Internal Revenue Code provision for 
taxation of decedents' estates did not authorize the taxa-
tion of powers of appointment. Respondent suggests that 
the Field case governs the disposition of the case before 
this court. 
The statute construed in th·e Field case (U.S. 
Statutes at Large, Vol. 39 p. 777-778) taxed: 
" * * * all property real or personal, tangible or 
intangible * * *." 
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Wher(\Jls our Utah statute (Title 59-12-3, U.C.A. 
1953) inc I udes : 
" * * * all property real or personal, * * * and 
any interest therein whether tangible or intangi-
ble which shall pa.ss to any person in trust or 
otherwise * * * ." (Emphasis added) 
Appellant submits that the substantial difference in 
wording, emphasis, and intended scope of the two 
statutes, destroys any compelling, or even persuasive, 
weight to he attached to the Field case. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant submits that the policies gave Mrs. Fen-
ner absolute title to the proceeds "held on deposit" for 
her, and suggests that the p-rovisions for withdrawal did 
not in any real way limit her ti tie. Furthermore, should 
this court choose to call these withdrawal p-rovisions a 
power of appointment, there is no reason in law, and 
certainly none in equity, why Respondent should thereby 
be allowed to evade payment of her fair share of this 
state's tax incidence. 
C. PRESTON ALLEN, 
ADAM M. DUNCAN, 
Attorneys for Appell'a.nt, 
Utah State Tax Commission. 
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